Introduction
The role of services in economic development has been attracting increasing attention. Examples include recent efforts to measure the share of value-added in traded goods that reflects embedded services, analysis of the trend towards servicification (manufacturing firms shifting to selling services as well as goods), and research on the determinants of structural transformation (the movement of workers and other factors of production from low to higher productivity activities). Structural transformation is usually characterized by an initial shift out of agriculture (employment in rural areas) into manufacturing (employment in urban areas), accompanied by a steady rise in the share of output and employment in services reflecting high income elasticities of demand for many services and a presumption that the productivity growth potential of many services sectors is limited.
A rapidly growing strand of the literature on services is concerned with the aggregate productivity effects of service sector performance. This has shown that services performance matters for firm-level competitiveness (productivity) in all sectors because many services are inputs into production, and many firms rely increasingly on a wide variety of service inputs that are sourced from outside suppliers. Of particular interest has been to better understand the effects of services policies on economic performance. There have been numerous empirical papers analyzing how services impact on economic performance and the effect of trade and other policies targeting service sectors on downstream productivity and/or export performance.
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Limited attention has been given to empirical assessment of how (changes in) services trade and investment and related regulatory policies impact on employment in manufacturing sectors.
This paper seeks to partially fill this gap with a focus on the experience of transition economies, thereby contributing to the literature on structural transformation and to the analysis of the effects of service sector policies. The paper complements the extant literature on productivity effects of services policies as well as studies of the employment effects of services offshoring. The latter strand of the literature identifies different theoretical channels with ambiguous predictions regarding the effects of services offshoring on employment. On the one hand, offshoring lowers input prices and increases profits, in turn potentially increasing manufacturing production and labor demand. On the other hand, higher quality and cheaper service inputs may substitute for labor used in production, leading to a decrease in labor demand (Amiti and Wei, 2006; Milberg and Winkler, 2010b and Winkler, 2010) .
Consistent with the theoretical ambiguity, the results of empirical analyses are mixed. Amiti and Wei (2005) find a positive correlation between services offshoring and employment in the UK between 1995 and 2001. Focusing on US sector-level data Amiti and Wei (2006) identify a negative effect of services offshoring on employment, using disaggregated data (450 sectors).
This negative impact vanishes if a less disaggregated sector classification is used, suggesting that there is sufficient growth in labor demand in sub-sectors within these broader categories to offset the negative effect. In the case of Germany Schöller (2007) finds a negative impact of services offshoring on low-skilled labor in manufacturing sectors for the 1991-2000 period, as does Winkler (2010) for the period 1995 . Milberg and Winkler (2010a and Milberg and Winkler (2015) extend this analysis to multi-country samples of OECD countries and show that negative impacts are attenuated by the existence of labor market institutions that reduce economic insecurity.
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In this paper we build on this literature to assess the effects of services-related policies on manufacturing employment for a panel of transition economies. Rather than focus on the impact 1 Firm-level analyses of productivity effects include Arnold et al. (2008 Arnold et al. ( , 2011 Fernandes and Paunov (2011); Forlani (2012) ; Duggan et al. (2013) ; Bas (2014) ; Hoekman and Shepherd (2015) and Arnold et al. (2016) . Studies using sector-level data include Barone and Cingano (2011) ; Bourlès et al. (2013) and Beverelli et al. (2015) .
2 Other research on the effect of services offshoring on productivity includes Görg and Hanley (2003) and Görg et al. (2008) working with plant-level data. Wright (2014) provides a theoretical analysis of the effect of (non services-specific) offshoring on employment. The structure and predictions of the model are in line with the services-specific mechanisms in the papers discussed in the text.
of specific decisions by firms (offshoring), our interest is in the effects of services policies. In addition to analyzing the effects of services reforms, we extend the analysis of Milberg and Winkler (2010a) and Milberg and Winkler (2015) by investigating the role of economic governance (rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory quality) in moderating the employment effects of services policy reforms. We argue that the quality of economic governance, as opposed to more narrow measures of employment protection used in the offshoring literature, may shape the effect of services policy reforms by affecting incentives to invest and expand manufacturing output.
Our study also adds to the broader literature on the effect of reforms in transition economies and the question whether countries that pursued deeper reforms performed better than average.
Studies on this subject mostly span country-level analysis, with mixed results regarding the effect of reforms on economic growth (see for instance the survey of empirical evidence in Falcetti et al., 2006) . We make two contributions. First, in assessing the impacts of reforms we take into account differences in the intensity of use of different types of services inputs. Second, because we are able to exploit the heterogeneity across manufacturing industries, our empirical specification allows estimation under weaker identifying assumptions than most previous studies through countryyear fixed effects. This mitigates potential endogeneity problems that may arise, e.g., if reform implementation is a function of the state of the overall economy.
Services reforms and employment in manufacturing
The services reforms that are the focus of analysis in what follows are pro-competitive in nature, comprising reductions in restrictions on international trade and inward foreign direct investment (FDI), the removal of barriers to entry for private firms and more generally the introduction of commercial freedoms, and actions to establish or strengthen regulatory regimes and implementing institutions. The policy indicators we use have been developed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and measure the distance between prevailing policies in a given year with what is deemed to constitute good (best) practice. They are unique in being available on an annual basis starting in 1990.
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Other things equal, movement in the direction of better economic governance and regulatory practices is expected to result in lower prices, higher quality and/or greater variety in the availability of producer services. Assuming this is the case, reforms may impact on manufacturing employment through different potential channels. Improved access to cheaper or higher quality services inputs may increase profits. Higher profit margins, in turn, may result in an expansion in the scale of production, through lower output prices or higher investment. Such a price-induced positive scale effect is likely to be associated with an increase in labor demand of the downstream sectors.
Alternatively, access to more efficient and technologically-advanced producer services may permit specialization by manufacturing firms in core activities. This may lead to an expansion of manufacturing production, but have ambiguous effects on manufacturing employment. Greater output may require more production workers, but if greater specialization entails outsourcing of non-core services activities, overall employment in manufacturing may decline. In this case there will be a reallocation of services workers across sectors, with ambiguous results as far as overall employment in downstream manufacturing industries is concerned.
4 Reforms that involve the removal of services trade barriers may also lead to services offshoring in addition to domestic outsourcing. If so, there might be direct replacement of domestic workers providing services (whether in-house or by specialized services firms) by more efficient or less expensive foreign workers employed abroad. 5 The upshot is that the net effect on manufacturing employment is unclear.
An additional complication that is specific to the transition context is that in the early years of economic reform changes in policies that led to hard budget constraints and cost-reflective pricesetting could lead to increases in prices of services inputs. If price controls and more generally non-market-based allocation of resources under central planning led to under-pricing of services inputs, the transition process will lead to increasing prices for such inputs to reflect their real market value. This was the case for energy services in many transition economies, which often was effectively subsidized for major manufacturing industries under central planning. Insofar as the initial years of transition were accompanied by increases in input costs for manufacturing industries that could not be passed on to customers, policy reforms would tend to increase costs, with a negative effect on output and employment. Moreover, pro-competitive reforms had the effect of disrupting long-established supply networks and contractual relationships between manufacturing plants and their suppliers (Roland and Verdier, 1999) reducing the contemporaneous efficiency gains of reforms. There are of course other transition-specific factors as well, including political economy forces, see for example BenYishay and Grosjean (2014) .
We abstract from the specific dimensions of the transition process in this paper. What matters for our analysis is that there are idiosyncratic factors that influence the employment effects of policy reforms undertaken in our sample of Eastern European and Central Asian (EECA) transition economies that will not be observed in market economies. The most important of these factors is that in transition countries policy reforms occurred in a setting where domestic services sectors were rather embryonic and/or stagnant. The share of services in GDP was invariably substantially below that observed in market-based economies with similar levels of industrial development, educational attainment and technical capacity. Reforms to open the economy, remove price and other controls and to permit entry into services activities triggered a rapid expansion of service industries with an associated increase in demand for workers in services sectors. Figure 1 illustrates this feature of the transition process. In the early 1990s the share of services in total employment in our sample was around 35%, as opposed to 60% on average in OECD member countries. During the two subsequent decades the share of services in total employment increased by 70% in our sample, as opposed to only 15% in OECD countries.
4 For a model of these types of effects see Francois (1990) . 5 These and similar effects have been discussed by Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006) and Winkler (2010) . 6 'EECA sample' refers to the 24 countries in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region covered in our empirical analysis. See Appendix A for a complete list of such countries. The employment share (% of total population) series are from the World Bank World Development Indicators. 'OECD countries' refers the the % of total employment 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 % of total employment 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2
Services Manufacturing
Clearly an increase in overall employment in services sectors was a basic feature of the transition process, reflecting a mix of new entry and investment in services activities and incentives for manufacturing industries to improve efficiency by outsourcing services. Our interest in what follows is the effect of services policy reforms on downstream manufacturing employment. While there are good reasons to expect this to be negative in the initial period of economic transition, it is possible that manufacturing employment could expand as a result of access to cheaper and better services inputs following reforms. Conversely, outsourcing of services could lead to a net reduction in manufacturing employment, complementing transition-specific factors that put pressure on manufacturing employment. Thus, the net effect of services reforms on downstream employment is essentially an empirical matter.
Empirical model
To estimate the impact of services policy reforms on manufacturing employment we follow an empirical methodology in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) This approach allows us to employ an exhaustive battery of fixed effects. Our baseline employment specification is given by the following equation:
where l cit is the natural logarithm of employment in country c and manufacturing sector i at time t. While particularly demanding on the data, this specification controls for any observed or unobserved heterogeneity at the country-sector (ζ ci ), country-time (η ct ) and sector-time (θ it )
level. In particular, the model accounts for many of the determinants of employment which are normally used in empirical studies of industry labor demand (Amiti and Wei, 2005 , Amiti and Wei, 2006 . Indeed, shocks to a particular country or sector at any point in time that affect the supply of labor, the price of intermediate inputs (including wages), output volumes and production technologies are subsumed in the country-time and industry-time fixed effects. On top of this, the country-sector fixed effects absorb all the time invariant characteristics that are idiosyncratic to each single country-sector pair including country-specific endowments which affect the underlying long-run labor intensity of a country's sectors and, in turn, their employment levels.
Following Blonigen (2015) , we first-difference the data by country-sector to control for countrysector fixed effects, as well as to mitigate time-series issues.
7 As a result we estimate the empirical model specified in the following equation:
There are several endogeneity concerns that need to be addressed. First, empirical studies adopting the difference-in-differences methodology pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) need to avoid the use of country specific input intensity measures becasue services input intensities in downstream sectors are likely to depend on services regulation itself (the policy treatment).
Moreover, an industrial strategy aiming at employment expansion could potentially imply the reduction of services outsourcing to boost in house activities. This would cause a problem of reverse causation from employment levels to the input-output component of our regressor of interest. The most widely adopted solution to these types of problems is to use a reference country as a unique source of input-output data, with the underlying assumption that the inputoutput linkages in the reference country are a good proxy for technological relationships between sectors. 8 We adopt this standard approach, computing technical coefficients from the mid-1990s
input-output matrix of the United States. We show in Section 5.6 that our results are robust to using country-specific coefficients.
Secondly, no fixed-effect solution is available for heterogeneity that has a country-sector-year nature and that could drive the relationship between employment in manufacturing and the policies affecting the services sectors. Two potential sources of omitted variable bias are output and wages. These variables are standard determinants of sectoral labor demand (a component of our depend variable) and they are likely to reflect shocks that are not only country-time or sector-time specific (as is the case for other determinants of labor demand as prices or technology shifters). Additionally they may be correlated with policy reforms in the services sector which can potentially affect the scale (output) and the labor skill composition (wages) in manufacturing industries. In order to account for omitted variable sources of endogeneity we augment the baseline specification with controls capturing the value of output and individual wages at the country, sector and time level.
Finally, a potential source of reverse causation is lobbying behavior, which may result in linkages between employment in manufacturing sectors and the policy component of our regressor of interest. In principle employment may in part reflect the incentives of a given industry in a country/time period to lobby for policy reforms in the services sector. In a similar empirical framework to the one used here, Beverelli et al. (2015) use an instrumental variable approach to
show that this potential source of endogeneity is weak and gives rise to negligible estimation biases when the dependent variable is a measure of productivity. In any event, we believe that lobbying incentives are more likely to be fixed in the short-run, reflecting long-standing relationships between the sectors and the political system. While this argument is less compelling in the case of our sample of transition economies, time varying shocks that originate from changes in the political system are captured by the country-time fixed effects.
Data
We use three distinct sources of information to construct the variables of our baseline specification (equation 3.2): (i) data on employment and other manufacturing sectors outcomes; (ii) measures of service sector policy reforms; and (iii) measures of the degree to which different manufacturing sectors source from the service sectors for which policies are being reformed.
The dependent variable (employment) comes from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics. This dataset contains information on output, value added, employment and wages for about 20 manufacturing industries per country. We also compute a measure of total factor productivity using this database.
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The key independent variable of interest (denoted as cref ) combines service sector reform indicators with input-output coefficients. The I-O coefficients are obtained from the OECD STAN 9 Output and value added per worker are expressed in nominal terms (current US dollars). Note however that given that we include sector-year fixed effect we absorb sector-specific changes in prices to the extent that they are uniform across countries. This appears like a reasonable assumption considering the tradable nature of the manufacturing sector output. For a similar argument see Rodrik (2013) . Our results are robust to the use of deflated series.
input-output tables. Unless stated otherwise, we use the mid-1990s US input-output table to compute the weights for all countries (i.e. we assume w scit = w s,U S,i,mid90s for all countries c). As discussed in Section 3, this practice is widespread in the literature following Rajan and Zingales (1998) . It is motivated by concerns regarding the endogeneity of weights with respect to domestic regulations, and a presumption that the United States economy is relatively undistorted so that its input-output coefficients are more likely to reflect technological properties of different manufacturing industries as opposed to the distortive effect of specific service regulations.
The indicators of service reforms are constructed by the EBRD, which has compiled these on an annual basis since 1989. The indicators are designed to monitor progress in policy reform in transition economies. They span a number of service sectors: financial services (banking and non-banking), transport (railways, roads), utilities (water, electricity) and telecommunications.
The indicators take a value ranging between 1 (no progress since 1989) to 4.3 (adoption of best practices comparable to advanced OECD economies). From this database we construct policy reform indicators for four services industries, finance, telecommunications, transport and utilities.
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The left panel of Figure .8 H u n g a r y S lo v e n ia L it h u a n ia P o la n d
A z e r b a ij a n L a t v ia R o m a n ia R u s s ia In addition to the cross-country variation in the pace and depth of reforms, countries also exhibit substantial cross-sector variation. This is evident from the right-hand panel in Figure 4 , which reports the standard deviation of the reform indicators across sectors for each country for three 10 Details on the EBRD raw data as well as on the construction of the services specific indicators used in our analysis are provided in Appendix C. different years (note that the standard deviation is zero for many countries in 1990, a year at which reforms toward a market economy had barely begun for most economies). Table 1 reports the average annual growth rate in employment across all sample countries for each sector. While overall employment in manufacturing has declined (as is evident from Figure   1 above), there is a lot of variation across industries within manufacturing. The table confirms the fact that decline in employment was much stronger during the 1990s than the 2000s. We see for instance that the motor vehicle industry shrank at a 9% a year during the 1990s but grew positively over the 2000-2012 period. Notes: Based on the estimating sample corresponding to 5,500 (sector-country-year) observations in 24 countries and 18 sectors over 23 years . Growth rates computed weighing observations based on their initial employment. Table 2 reports the mean and standard deviations of the key dependent and explanatory variables for our estimating sample, both in levels and in first-differences (thus reflecting more accurately the variation we exploit to estimate our model). Notes: Based on the estimating sample corresponding to 5,500 (sector-country-year) observations in 24 countries and 18 sectors over 23 years .
Results

Main estimation results
Results for the estimation of our baseline model are given in the first column of Table 3 . The coefficient for cref shows that services policy reforms have a negative and statistically significant effect on downstream employment. This result holds true -with minor changes in magnitude and within the standard levels of statistical significance -when the specification is augmented with the log of output (column 2), the log of individual wages (column 3) or both (column 4).
Note that in these cases the signs of the coefficients for output and wages are consistent with the standard empirical results on labor demand, which is positively associated with production and negatively associated with the cost of labor. 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2007 Notes: All models are estimated in country-sector first-differences and include country-time and sector-time fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported between brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
As a robustness check, in the last two models reported in Table 3 we augment our preferred specification of column 4 with imports at the manufacturing sector-country-year level.
12 This additional control is chosen to capture policy reforms that vary across downstream manufacturing sectors, countries and years. Absent any specific data source for manufacturing sector-specific reforms for our sample, we use trade developments as a proxy for the more general pattern of reforms across manufacturing sectors. Given that the structure of import protection implemented To provide a sense of the economic meaning of our estimates we use the results from our preferred specification in column (4) to quantitatively assess the employment effect of a pro-competitive policy change consisting in a one standard deviation increase in each services sector-specific policy reform index. The downstream effect of a policy shift depends upon the input intensity coefficients and therefore is specific to each manufacturing sector i. Given that our dependent variable is expressed in logs, the percentage change in manufacturing sector i ′ s employment level resulting from a one standard deviation increase in all services policy measures is computed as:
where L denotes employment without the log transformation and ∆cref i is the normalized version of ∆CREF i = ∑ s (σ s ×w si ), with σ s being a standard deviation in the distribution of sector s policy measures. 14 Standard deviations are computed for the country-year pairs in the estimation sample of Table 3 . They are equal to 0.73 for finance and insurance; 0.94 for telecommunications; 0.75 for transport services; and 0.84 for utilities. These variations represent very common occurrences in our sample. All countries undergo changes of a one standard deviation in their reform indicators in all sectors at least once; 11 countries out of 24 go through reforms of twice 12 Import data are from the World Bank WITS database (see Table A -1 in Appendix A). Given the use of country-time and sector-time fixed effects in the estimation there is no need to correct the import valuesexpressed in absolute terms -by scaling them with country or sector level characteristics varying across time.
13 Given that the estimated coefficients for the log of imports are not statistically significant, the increase in the magnitude and statistical significance of the cref coefficients may be largely driven by the changes in the estimation sample.
14 In order to derive ∆crefi we proceed as follows. First we compute CREF σ cit = ∑ s (REFsct + σs) × wsi. As in the case of CREF , the input-output technical coefficients are taken from a reference country (the US) and a reference period (mid 90s). Then we normalise this quantity using the minimum and maximum value of CREFcit to obtain cref σ cit . Finally we subtract crefcit from cref σ cit . The resulting difference, denoted by ∆crefi varies only at the manufacturing sector level and represents -in the normalised scale of crefi -the increase by one standard deviation in the policy reform variables. this magnitude. Standing out in the sample, Czech Republic and Estonia implemented reforms of 3 times this magnitude.
As shown in Table 4 , the employment effect of the hypothesised reform results in a -4.16% decline in the downstream sector with the lowest average services input intensity (manufacturing of office, accounting and computer machinery). The policy change is associated with a -18.90% reduction in employment level for the downstream sector with the highest average requirement of services intermediates (manufacturing of non-metallic mineral products). Notes: ISIC rev.3, 2 digits classification in parenthesis.
Heterogeneous effects across country groups and time periods
Economic governance and human capital
We now exploit the country-level heterogeneity in our sample to analyze whether and how the negative effect found in Section 5.1 changes when computed over subsamples defined in terms of relevant country-level characteristics. In particular we are interested in investigating the role of broad indicators of economic governance as well as human capital at the country level in influencing the downstream employment impacts of services policy reforms.
In principle, the role of governance institutions in shaping the employment effect of services reforms is ambiguous. On the one hand good institutions (high regulatory quality, control of corruption and rule of law) may support more rapid firm level adjustment to policy reforms.
Good institutions can allow firms to substitute in-house activities with more efficient services coming from a reformed sector, minimising rigidities due to contractual inefficiencies or the need to confront distortionary special interests. Moreover, good institutions may permit a more rapid response of the services sector itself, enhancing the capacity to absorb workers from the adjusting downstream sectors. If so, such mechanisms may reduce the social costs of adjustment by manufacturing industries (a 'substitution' effect of economic governance). On the other hand, good institutions may complement policy reforms by helping to attract better quality services (and services providers) into the country (see Beverelli et al., 2015) . More efficient services inputs are likely to help domestic manufacturing to specialize and expand the scale of production.
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This would result in a positive employment effect of services reforms (a 'scale' effect of economic governance).
Turning to the role of human capital, if -as suggested by recent empirical studies of services offshoring 16 -a reform-induced expansion in access to efficient producer services triggers a pattern of skill upgrading at the firm and industry level, reforming countries with more skilled labor (higher human capital) may be able to better match this increase in demand for skilled labor, with a direct positive effect on manufacturing employment. This in turn would support specialisation and scale effects that expand labor demand. Overall, high human capital endowments therefore should be associated with a positive effect of services reforms on employment.
As measures of economic governance we use three variables reported in the Worldwide Governance Indicators Database (World Bank), i.e. regulatory quality, control of corruption and rule of law. 17 As a proxy for human capital we take the gross enrolment ratio in secondary education for both sexes from the World Development Indicators (World Bank). For each moderating variable m we divide the estimation sample into two subsamples and compute the country-specific average of m across available years, obtaining the variablem. We then divide all countries in two quantiles (LOW and HIGH), below and above the sample median ofm. For each subsample we estimate both the baseline specification and (for robustness purposes) the baseline model augmented with output and wages. Table 5 present the results.
With respect to the full-sample results (Table 3) , the negative employment effect of services reforms appears stronger when estimated for those countries with a lower level of economic governance or human capital (LOW quantile of them distribution). It is also always statistically different from 0 at least at a 10% significance level. This result is robust to the inclusion of output and wages as additional controls. Conversely, when estimated for the subsamples corresponding to the high governance or high human capital countries (HIGH quantile of them distribution), the effect of services reforms is attenuated in both its magnitude and statistical significance. In particular, the coefficient of cref is always smaller (in negative terms) than the corresponding full-sample estimation and it is statistically different from 0 only for the baseline specification in the case when the moderating variable is the rule of law indicator (column 3 in Panel B).
These results suggest that both high levels of economic governance and human capital reduce the negative effect of services policy reforms on manufacturing employment.
The transition economies in our sample comprise two groups, with one set of countries having gone through a process of accession to the EU and another that has not. The set of reforms 15 See Francois (1990) . 16 See for instance Geishecker and Görg (2013) . 17 Data on these variables are available for all 24 EBRD countries in our sample for the following years : 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002-2012. Notes: Dependent variable always equal to log employment. All models are estimated in country-sector first-differences and include country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported between brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. required for integration into the EU is in large part designed to bring the institutional environment of a country closer to EU norms and standards for a wide range of policy areas, including the judiciary, the civil service (bureaucratic efficiency) and the enforcement of competition policy. A priori, accession countries should be characterised by better governance and institutions than non-accession countries, with ambiguous implications for the the impact on the downstream manufacturing employment (as discussed above). Replicating the estimation of the baseline and augmented model on the subsample of countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 we find that the effect of services policy reforms on downstream manufacturing employment, while still negative and significant for the countries that did not join the EU in 2004, becomes statistically non-different from zero in accession countries.
18 Table 6 regulatory quality, control of corruption and rule of law. Notes: Dependent variable always equal to log employment. All models are estimated in country-sector first-differences and include country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported between brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Stages of the transition process
An important factor that may have an impact on the estimation of the effect of services reforms on downstream employment is the general transition process in the economies in our sample. In particular, it is reasonable to assume that the initial stages of the transition processes involving large scale changes in the economic environment will swamp any potential positive downstream scale effect from access to (more) efficient services inputs. As has been documented in the literature, transition economies underwent "transformational recessions" (Kornai, 1994; da Rocha, 2015 ) that were associated with the breakdown of long-standing relationships and inter-sectoral linkages. If we replicate the analysis by estimating our model separately for the first and second half of the 23 years of our sample, we find that the negative effect of services reform is associated with the early stages of transition.
19 Table 7 presents estimates for both the baseline equation and the model augmented with output and wages. In the two models corresponding to the first half of our sample (columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 ), the coefficient of the composite reform indicator is negative, statistically significant and slightly larger in size than is the case using the full-sample. For the second half of the sample period (columns 3 and 4) the coefficient remains negative but is smaller in magnitude and loses statistical significance.
Heterogeneity across services sectors
We now relax the assumption, implicit in the construction of our composite reform indicator in (3.1), that the impact of policy reforms is homogeneous across services sectors. To do so we define four sector specific variables as the product of the sector specific policy reform indicator Notes: Dependent variable always equal to log employment. All models are estimated in country-sector first-differences and include countrytime and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported between brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
with the corresponding vector of input-output weights. Formally, for each services sector s we
Columns 1-4 of Table 8 report the estimation results when each of these sector-specific indicators is used to replace the aggregate variable cref . Notes: All models are estimated in country-sector first-differences and include country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported between brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The only sector-specific policy reform indicator for which the estimated coefficient remains significantly negative is that of utilities (column 1). For transport services (in column 2) the magnitude of the estimate is reduced (in negative terms) and statistical significance is absent at the stan-dard levels. Moving to telecommunication (column 3) and financial services (column 4) the sign of the coefficient becomes positive even though not statistically significant. To further explore the role of utilities we construct a version of cref that accounts only for reforms in transport, telecommunications and financial services. The last column of Table 8 shows that when utilities are excluded from the construction of the aggregate composite reform indicator the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is reduced by more than a half with respect to its value in Table 3 and statistical significance decreases below the 10% threshold.
The results presented in Table 8 suggest that policy reforms targeting electricity, water and waste water related services (utilities) are particularly important for the negative downstream employment effect of services reforms. These are sectors where low values of the EBRD reform indicator reflect monopoly/State ownership and therefore most likely non cost-reflective tariffs (prices), cross-subsidization and soft budget constraints. As a result, policy reforms to introduce commercial pressures may increase services input costs for downstream manufacturing sectors (see Gray, 1995; Freund and Wallich, 1997; Stern and Davis, 1998 , for detailed discussions of utilities markets reforms in transition economies). 20 These results suggest that the overall negative impact on downstream employment is likely to be partly driven by the effects of reforms in the utilities sector on energy-intensive manufacturing sectors.
Lagged effects of services reforms
In this section we investigate the linkages between services reforms and manufacturing employment beyond the instantaneous impact estimated in Table 3 . It is plausible that such intersectoral relationships -from upstream producer services to downstream manufacturing employment -would be active and evolve for more than one year. In order to test for the existence of non-contemporaneous effects of service reforms on downstream employment we include several lags of cref . Table 9 presents the results. The point estimates are negative for the contemporaneous change and the first lag and then turn positive. This suggests that the cumulated effect over time might be less negative than what our previous estimates suggested. However we note that the coefficients on lag values are very imprecisely estimated and always associated with p-values above 10%. We also remark that the contemporaneous effect becomes more negative when the lag values are included and that it remains rather stable, showing that the coefficient is robust to the inclusion of lags. Overall we find little support for the notion that longer run effects of policy reforms offset short-run negative impacts on manufacturing employment.
20 While consistent time series data for energy producer prices in our sample of countries are not available before 2007, non-systematic evidence reported in various EBRD Transition Reports reveals a pattern of rising energy and utility prices associated with transition. EBRD (1996) notes that energy prices charged to producers in 1994 were relatively close to those in the EU for those economies that were already at an advanced stage of transition (primarily Eastern European countries and the Baltics), while they remained significantly lower in countries that were still at an early stage of transition (mainly CIS countries). Notes: All models are estimated in country-sector first-differences and include country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported between brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Services reforms and productivity
A negative effect on manufacturing employment is consistent with the general result found in the literature cited previously that restrictive services trade policies have adverse effects on productivity of downstream firms and industries. To put our negative employment finding into context, we assess the effect of services reforms on manufacturing productivity in our sample of countries. We rely on the baseline model specified in (3.2) using a measure of productivity as dependent variable. The main potential sources of endogeneity are, mutatis mutandis, analogous to those discussed in Section 3. While we continue to use the US I-O coefficients to generate input intensity measures to minimise reverse causality issues, we do not include any additional control varying at the country-sector-time level. Our assumption is that the relevant variation in the key determinants of productivity such as R&D intensity is driven by either long-run characteristics (factor endowments, economic geography) or by shocks at the country or industry level (technology, political economy dynamics, etc.) and, therefore, is controlled for by the fixed effects.
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Our first measure of productivity is the natural logarithm of value added per employee (labor productivity). This measure has the advantage of limiting the extent to which the sample size is reduced (a decrease in the number of observations of some 20%). However, as this is a rather rough and limited proxy for productivity, we also construct a measure of total factor productivity (TFP) using standard accounting techniques. We use a Cobb-Douglas model, such 21 The validity of this identification strategy is confirmed by the stability of the estimates for the employment model when moving from the baseline specification to that featuring country-sector-time controls (log output and log wages). A similar approach is adopted in Blonigen (2015) who uses a less demanding version of this empirical model (not including sector-time fixed effects) to investigate the impact of industrial policy in the steel sector on downstream sectors export competitiveness.
that log T F P cit = log V A cit − a log L cit − (1 − a) log K cit , where V A denotes real value added; 22 a is the sectoral share parameter set equal to 2/3 (as in Cipollina et al., 2012) ; L and K are respectively employment and the real capital stock. Following Levchenko et al. (2009) , the series for capital is constructed using the standard inventory method, where the capital stock in year t is given by K cit = (1 − d)K ci(t−1) + I cit with I real investment, the depreciation rate d set equal to 0.08 and the initial level of capital stock given by K ci0 = I ci0 d. 23 The resulting TFP measure improves upon value added per worker as proxy for productivity. However it entails a significant reduction in the size of the estimation sample.
24
The results reported in Table 10 indicate a positive effect of services sector reforms on downstream productivity. The magnitude of the positive coefficient in the model for labor productivity (column 1 of Table 10 ) is about twice that of the negative coefficient in the employment model (Table 3 , column 4). This no doubt reflects a mechanical increase in labor productivity that is the counterpart of the reduction in the level of employment. Notes: All models are estimated in country-sector firstdifferences and include country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported between brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The positive sign and the statistical significance of the productivity effect is confirmed by the estimated cref coefficient in the TFP model (Table 10 , column 2).
25 The magnitude of this coefficient implies a sector-specific increase in TFP, following an increase by one standard deviation in all services reform indicators, from 3.33% to 15.11%. The complete list of TFP effects is given in Table 11 .
More generally, these results suggest that, even if services reforms do not trigger a net increase in employment in manufacturing sectors, downstream manufacturing productivity unambiguously benefits from pro competitive policy reforms in producer service sectors.
22 Real value added is obtained by deflating the UNIDO value added series in US dollars by the (output-side) price level for the US with reference year equal to 2005. We use price data from the Penn World Table, version 8.1 (see Feenstra et al., 2015) .
23 As in Beverelli et al. (2015) we take Ici0 as the first non-missing datapoint in the real investment series starting from the 1960s. The series of real investment is constructed by deflating the UNIDO investment series with the (capital formation) price levels reported in the Penn World Table, version 8.1. 24 This is due to the limited coverage of investment data for the countries and sectors in our sample. 25 Beverelli et al. (2015) show that the quality of governance institutions impacts on the downstream productivity effects of services trade policy. The estimation sample for model 2 in Table 10 covers 17 countries including some with weak or fragile governance institutions such as Albania, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Mongolia. This makes the positive effect result fairly general and not completely driven by the average quality of economic governance in the subsample. (32) 3.70 Medical, precision and optical instruments (33) 4.32 Other transport equipment (35) 4.73 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c (31) 4.81 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34) 4.93 Machinery and equipment n.e.c (29) 5.04 Food products, beverages and tobacco (15, 16) 5.51 Manufacturing n.e.c; recycling (36, 37) 5.55 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear (17) (18) (19) 5.61 Fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment (28) 6.15 Wood and products of wood and cork (20) 6.56 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing (21, 22) 7.66 Rubber and plastics products (25) 8.90 Chemicals and chemical products (24) 8.99 Basic metals (27) 10.33 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (23) 14.82 Other non-metallic mineral products (26) 15.11
Notes: ISIC rev.3, 2 digits classification in parenthesis.
Further robustness checks
The robustness of the negative employment effect of our composite services reform indicator to alternative measures of services input intensity can be assessed by replacing the US I-O coefficients with coefficients derived from the US Leontief inverse matrix. These capture, beyond the direct upstream-downstream connections, also the set of indirect relationships linking two sectors at any position in the supply chain.
26 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 12 show that taking these indirect linkages into account still results in a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the composite reform index cref . This holds for both our baseline specification and the model augmented with output and wages. The use of Leontief coefficients increases the magnitude of the estimates by between 50 and 75% compared to those reported in Table 3 . This is consistent with a higher degree of input intensity (both direct and indirect) embedded in the Leontief weights.
To assess the validity of our identification assumption about the representativeness of US social accounting matrix and its capacity to capture the technological linkages between sectors rather than US-specific shocks we build an alternative version of the composite reform indicator using input-output coefficients derived from country-specific social accounting matrices. Conditioning on data availability limitations which significantly reduce the estimation sample, 27 the estimates in columns 3-6 of Table 12 confirm the negative and statistically significant employment effect of services reforms. This holds across both specifications and types of input-output coefficients.
26 See Appendix B for the derivation of different input-output coefficients. 27 Country-specific matrices from OECD STAN database are available for only 11 of the 24 countries in our full sample: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey. We choose the mid 2000s as a reference period to maximize country coverage.
The magnitude of the effects is consistent with the estimates using US as a reference country: in case of the specification with output and wages, the use of country-specific weights increases (in negative terms) the coefficient on cref by 15%. Notes: Dependent variable always equal to log employment. All models are estimated in country-sector first-differences and include country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported between brackets.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Finally, to check whether our baseline results reflect the excessive influence of the country with the highest or lowest average policy reform value across services sectors (respectively Estonia and Bosnia Herzegovina) we alternatively exclude these countries from the estimation sample and assess how the resulting coefficients are affected. We replicate this exercise excluding one-by-one the sectors with the highest and lowest average value of services input use intensity (respectively manufacturing of non metallic mineral products -ISIC code 26 -and manufacturing of office, accounting and computing machinery, ISIC code 30). As shown in Table 13 , the coefficients are robust to the exclusion of these extreme cases, that is, they remain negative and significant at the 5% level. Notes: Dependent variable always equal to log employment. All models are estimated in country-sector first-differences and include country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Influential countries are defined as those with the highest and lowest average value of policy reform indicators across services sectors (respectively Estonia and Bosnia Herzegovina). Influential sectors are defined as those with the highest and lowest average value of services input intensity across services sectors (respectively manufacturing of non metallic mineral products -ISIC code 26 -and manufacturing of office, accounting and computing machinery, ISIC code 30). Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported between brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyze the effect of services policy reforms on downstream employment in manufacturing. This is a subject of general interest that has not been the focus of much crosscountry empirical research, in part because of lack of time series data on applied service sector policies for many countries. The performance of services sectors can have a significant impact on industries that use services as intermediate inputs. Our results complement the literature identifying positive productivity effects of pro-competitive services policy reforms by documenting the existence of a negative relationship between services policy reforms that move countries towards what are regarded to be best practices and employment in downstream manufacturing industries. We also find that the negative effect on manufacturing employment is mitigated or disappears for countries with high levels of economic governance and human capital, pointing to the importance of the broader business environment and investment climate in moderating the impacts of services policy reforms.
Our analysis is based on a panel of sector-level data for 24 transition economies for the 1990-2012
period. The focus on these countries is motivated in large part by the availability of annual time series data on applied services policies. The transition economies that are the focus of analysis are in many ways exceptional, but for our purposes a key feature of these countries is that the EBRD has been compiling services sector-specific policy indicators for over two decades. While this has benefits in permitting the use of a large battery of fixed effects, which in principle should do much to control for the idiosyncratic features of these countries, the potential downside is that our results, notwithstanding the controls, may not have general validity.
Whatever the case may be in this regard, our results suggest that services policy reforms are one factor explaining the declining share of manufacturing that occurred in the transition economies.
Overall service sector employment grew rapidly following the demise of central planning. This structural transformation of the transition economies is not surprising, of course, given the distorted initial conditions that prevailed in these countries. Employment statistics for these countries show that the share of total employment in manufacturing initially declined for the group as a whole, and then gradually increased (see Figure 1 above). Moving towards best practice services policies was associated with an economically significant reduction of manufacturing employment, helping to explain the observed trend in sectoral employment shares. Our results suggest that at the aggregate level the potential positive scale effect of better access to services for downstream manufacturing industries is more than offset by incentives to outsource non-core tasks and the associated reduction in the workforce employed in manufacturing. log T F P cit Log of total factor productivity in manufacturing sector i in country c at time t. log T F P cit is defined in Section 5.5. Source: value added, total employment, investment from UNIDO INDSTAT4, Rev. 3. Prices from Penn World 
Appendices A Appendix tables
Technical coefficients
Technical coefficients are derived from the intermediate demand matrix M (the first quadrant of a social accounting matrix). M is a square matrix of dimension n where rows -indexed by r -are the supplying industries (domestic and international) and the columns -k -the using (domestic) industries. The number of industries in M is equal to n. A generic element m rk of M represents the cost borne by sector k for the output produced by sector r (as domestic production plus imported foreign production) and used as intermediate input into k. Technical coefficients are the elements of the square matrix A, defined as:
where Y is an n-dimension square matrix where the main diagonal includes the inverse output of each industry and all the other elements are equal to zero. For each services-manufacturing sector pair (s, i), the technical coefficient is given by the element a si of matrix A and it measures the cost of the intermediate inputs from services sector s for one dollar of total production of manufacturing sector i.
Leontief coefficients
The alternative measures of input intensity used in the paper are the coefficients derived from the Leontief inverse matrix. The input intensity of services sector s into manufacturing sector i that takes into account all the indirect linkages between the (upstream) supplying and the (downstream) using sector is given by the element l si of matrix L, defined as:
where V is a dimension n square matrix of zeros, except along the main diagonal, that includes the value added-output ratios of each industry. B is the Leontief inverse (I −A) −1 , with A defined in equation (B-1) above.
• Water: 1 corresponds to minimal degree of decentralisation and no commercialisation with no financial autonomy capacity at municipal level; 4.3 implies that water utilities fully decentralised and commercialised.
